

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16191

The Secretary assured the committee—in his reply found on pages 968-969 of the printed hearings—that the amending procedures has no bearing on the recognition question. He also replied that the East German regime is a party to 24 international conventions, and that the United States and West Germany are both parties to 11 of these. I would note that all 11 of these treaties have been in effect for more than 10 years and do not imply recognition by us of East Germany. These agreements, together with East Germany's bilateral undertakings, are listed starting on page 969 of the printed hearings.

It should also be noted that East Germany has already acceded to the treaty in Moscow. The process of its accession did not and will not require any official action by the United States even hinting at recognition. The Soviet Union sent a note advising the United States of the accession to the treaty in Moscow of East Germany and a number of other countries. The United States responded by notifying the Soviet Government that since it did not recognize the East German regime as a government, the United States could only take note of the fact that the authorities in that country had signed on in Moscow and could not accept notice of East Germany's signature. Thus, the recognition question remains unaffected by the treaty.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, I have not resolved any of the questions raised by the senior Senator from Maine for I do not believe they can at this time be resolved by facts but only by well-based opinions. The answers I have given here were selected from many answers that could have been chosen, but having heard most of the testimony and studied the record as best I could, these are the answers that are satisfactory to me and will prove to be correct.

- I do not deny there are risks in this treaty. As the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said in opening this debate:

There are, to be sure, risks in such an approach. There is an element of trust in it, and we can be betrayed. But human life is fraught with risks and the behavior of the same man is not the avoidance of all possible danger, but the weighing of greater against lesser risks and of risks against opportunities.

There are risks in this nuclear test ban treaty, but they are lesser rather than greater risks and the political opportunities outweigh the military risks. As George Kennan has written: "Whoever is not prepared to make sacrifices and to accept risks in the military field should not lay claim to any serious desire to see world problems settled by any means short of war."

Mr. President, I must say to the Senator from Maine that our national safety and security are already in jeopardy in a world that permits unlimited testing. Ratification of this limited test ban treaty in itself will not make that situation more or less hazardous. If the treaty works, however, it may over a period of time form the basis for further agreements that may bring us peacefully away from this point of jeopardy. If the treaty does not work, then a future

nuclear war will in all probability solve all our problems.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to go back into the first chapter of the Senator's discussion.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Is it the understanding of the Senator from Alabama that we have reliable knowledge concerning the tests made by Red Russia with regard to the blackout impact, the weapons effects impact, and the technological knowledge possessed by Russia in all fields? I refer especially to the Senator's suggestion that the transcript of Mr. McCone's testimony be read.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I understand.

Mr. LAUSCHE. To repeat my question, is it the understanding of the Senator from Alabama that we have reliable knowledge concerning first, the status of the development of antiballistic missiles in Russia; second, the blackout impact by high yield bombs; third, the effects upon weapons of the high yield bomb explosions; and fourth, the technical knowledge acquired?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me call the attention of the Senator to the quotation I gave from Dr. Harold Brown's testimony. We will take high altitude blackout first. He said:

With respect to high altitude blackout, the Chiefs say the Soviets have some data that we do not have. I would say yes, and we have some data they may not have.

I do not think it is anywhere plain that we necessarily know everything the Russians learned from those tests; but, on the other hand, I think sometimes we are prone to emphasize what they may have learned from them. There was testimony on high altitude blackout by Mr. McCone. I recommended that that testimony be read. I think it is quite reassuring.

So far as weapons effects are concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in weapons effects knowledge derived from high yield nuclear explosions. But Dr. Brown said—and this indicates the difference of opinion which arises on many of these questions:

My interpretation of all the data indicates that although they have done more high yield tests, they were not effects tests.

So I think we must admit that it is not known to an absolute certainty.

Mr. LAUSCHE. To me it seems that we do not have the knowledge, and because we do not have the knowledge we draw the inference that they have not made achievements in these fields. The impression of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the Senator from Alabama has stated, is that they have excelled us in certain fields. I know Dr. Brown has taken a different position.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I put the question to him: "You do not believe that they developed an antiballistic missile?" and he said, "Yes, that is my belief." I asked him, "Why do you believe that?" His answer was, "Because I do not think it can be done."

Mr. SPARKMAN. If I remember correctly, Dr. Brown's attitude with respect to the antiballistic missile was that the best defense was a penetration of the other side, rather than trying to knock missiles out of the sky after they got over our country.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I was amazed by his idea that the development of an antiballistic missile was beyond the realm of achievement, but that the research and development should go on because of the particular good that comes from incidental discoveries that are made.

I asked him, "Why do you think that surrounding Leningrad in Red Russia is installed a system of antiballistic weapons?"

His answer was that he thought somebody had sold a bill of goods to Khrushchev.

I hope so, but Khrushchev is not sold a bill of goods with that ease.

Still, I do not believe that the question which I put, "Do we have reliable knowledge on these items?" that can be answered in the affirmative.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I agree with the Senator. Let us consider the high-yield weapons, for example. This is a point everyone should keep in mind. At the time when we were testing, and the whole world was free to test, there was no ban of any kind whatsoever. When we were testing, the military authorities, those on the Atomic Energy Commission, and those in charge of determining what course we should take, including our scientists, all deliberately reached the decision that we did not want to test for high-yield weapons, because we did not want to develop high-yield weapons; that we preferred numerous relatively small-yield weapons. I hesitate to call them small-yield weapons, because they have tremendous impact, but, nevertheless, relatively speaking, they are weapons of small yield. It was felt that such weapons in larger numbers were much better for our purposes than were high-yield weapons.

So it is not a question of the Russians having stepped out ahead of us with their testing; the fact is that we did not want to test and did not test when we had the opportunity to do so. We decided it was something we did not want, and did not test.

Mr. LAUSCHE. May I put a further question?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the 100-megaton bomb, with the added weight that must be thrown into the air, would the Senator from Alabama say that, because of the propulsion devices developed by Red Russia, they are in a better position to throw a heavier bomb into the air than we are?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe it is generally admitted that Red Russia is ahead of us at the moment in that respect, but that situation is only temporary. I had the pleasure of seeing something being developed for us recently, in my own home town, that I was told would transcend anything that the Russians have yet developed. I think it is well-known that the propulsion we are getting ready to utilize will go far beyond anything

that Russia has available or that she is likely to develop any time soon.

Mr. LAUSCHE. If and when that develops, will it not follow that we may change our attitude and may want to throw bombs of higher yield into the air than we have done heretofore?

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator will recall that there was a mass of testimony on that very score, and we were told that such tests could be carried on to a degree—perhaps not as high as 100 megatons. If I remember correctly, it was testified that we could develop bombs as high as 60 megatons.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Fifty or sixty.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is my recollection that we could develop bombs as high as 60 megatons with the knowledge we have, and by making certain tests underground.

In that connection, let me quote something from General LeMay that was rather significant. This had to do with the antiballistic missile. General LeMay said:

I think both of us are going to develop antimissile systems.

This testimony was taken in executive session, and that part can be published, but there is a deletion.

This was not before our committee; it was before the Armed Services Committee. This testimony was given before the treaty was signed. This was testimony on military procurement authorizations, in February. I quote from it, leaving out the deletions, where confidential information was given:

I think both of us are going to develop antimissile systems and the first systems that will evolve are going to be very expensive and only defend a small segment of Russia, and the same thing applies to our antimissiles.

I firmly believe that we can keep ahead of them in our offensive systems so we can penetrate anything that they can come up with in an antiballistic missile system.

Let me put it this way, Senator. I think we are relatively in the same ball park as far as ability in antiballistic missile systems is concerned.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, there is still great difficulty for me in trying to reconcile what General LeMay said about developing an antiballistic missile system with what Dr. Brown said in stating that he did not believe it could be developed.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Dr. Brown takes the attitude that penetration capability is overriding. By the way, General LeMay indicates that, too, if the Senator will notice it.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Yes; I noticed that.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We could build anything to penetrate that they might develop.

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. There is no question that the Russians have developed and have tested, in 1961 and 1962, and have learned information from those tests, is there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct.

Mr. THURMOND. The question has been raised as to whether we had learned

as much in testing as had the Soviets, because we tested more atmospheric shots. The United States has conducted no experiments comparable in complexity with those of the Soviet operations. A disturbing number of U.S. high-altitude effects experiments which were conducted were compromised either by considerations of unrelated, technical objectives of the test program, or by inadequate or faulty experiments, or operational inadequacies.

That is true, is it not?

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Russians carried on a great many more tests during that series than we did. We did not carry on an equal number of tests. They carried on high-altitude tests, and they carried on high-yield tests that we did not duplicate when we got around to testing. I admit that.

Mr. THURMOND. The United States would be unable to acquire data on high-altitude nuclear weapons effects unless it tests in the atmosphere, will it?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe it is only fair to say that the preponderance of evidence—practically all of it—before the committee was to the effect that for the purpose of developing an anti-ballistic missile—and I presume that is what the Senator is aiming at, and also the high-yield weapon—so far as developing an anti-ballistic-missile system was concerned, we had all the information that we needed so far as effects were concerned, and that what we needed was the work that could be carried on in laboratories relating to guidance, selectivity—if I may use that term, although I do not think that that term was used—for trying to ferret out real missiles instead of the decoys that might be sent out, but that we did not need to do any atmospheric testing in order to study the problems concerned with further development.

Mr. THURMOND. The Preparedness Subcommittee in one of its findings, No. 3, made this statement:

The United States will be unable to acquire data on high altitude nuclear weapons effects.

That means without atmospheric testing.

All seven members of the Preparedness Subcommittee agreed to the factual accuracy of the report, even the two members who will vote for ratification, the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] and the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]. There is no question about that, is there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I was not a member of the subcommittee. I would rather not be called upon to interpret what the subcommittee said.

Mr. THURMOND. This is on page 7 of the subcommittee's report.

Mr. SPARKMAN. In the testimony before our committee, certain limits were recognized; but, in spite of that fact we were told that research and development could be carried on, and that we did not need to do atmospheric testing in order to carry on effectively. I would like to recall this again.

Mr. McCone, who heads the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense

McNamara, every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Brown—who, I think, will be admitted to be a man of unusual competence in this field—are aware of the same problems; yet they support the treaty and say we ought to ratify it.

Mr. THURMOND. But the fact remains that without testing in the atmosphere, the United States will be unable to acquire data on high altitude nuclear weapons effects. Is this not important because such data are necessary to the design of antiballistic missile systems, warheads, and radars?

Mr. SPARKMAN. We were told time and time again in the Foreign Relations Committee—and I believe we were told this many times when the Senator from South Carolina was present—that the design, development, and manufacture of warheads did not present a problem to us, because we already had them; that we had all the information we needed on them, not only with reference to design, but that we actually had them on hand. Such further study of the problems connected with that activity could be carried on in laboratories and with a limited amount of underground testing.

Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator mean that we now have the type of design of warhead that we need to penetrate the defenses of the enemy?

Mr. SPARKMAN. In the committee report, at the bottom of page 14, and continuing on to page 15, we have this brief statement:

But in any case, after considering all of the testimony on this subject, the committee agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "in the antiballistic missile field, development of the U.S. system does not depend on atmospheric testing."

That categorical statement was made time after time before our committee. I think we have a right to rely upon it. I do not believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff would join in such a statement as that if they did not believe it to be true.

Mr. THURMOND. My question was not about the use of the ballistic missile. I was asking about the design of the warhead that is necessary to penetrate the Soviet missile defense. How do we know we have that design? How will we ever know we have it until such a warhead has been designed and has been tested in the atmosphere in which it will have to function when the time comes?

Mr. SPARKMAN. If I interpret the Senator's question correctly, it is the substance of the second question propounded by the Senator from Maine, which was the one I had started to take up when the Senator from South Carolina asked me to yield to him. So if he will permit me to discuss it, we can have a discussion about it later.

Mr. THURMOND. On the same point, about testing, someone has said that we have learned as much about testing as the Soviets, because we have tested more shots than have the Soviets. Is it not true that above values of 10 megatons, the Soviets conducted, in 1961 and 1962, more than twice the number of tests the United States ever conducted in its entire history of testing?